The Growth Diagnosis TreeAppendixRE-FG1 1.0
The Growth Diagnosis Tree — Printable text version
The whole tree as text: every node with its question; at the leaves the evidence, test, diagnosis and 30-day intervention. Print it or save it as a PDF.
The identity
R = (D × c + P × r) × f × s × v
Symbols
- R: Net sales before VAT, after discount, like-for-like branches
- D: Demand reaching you: people new to the brand who reached you
- c: Conversion: new customers ÷ D
- P: Inherited base: last period's active customers
- r: Return rate: known customers who bought this period ÷ P
- f: Frequency: attempted transactions ÷ active customers
- s: Service rate (capacity): served ÷ attempted transactions
- v: Average value: net sales ÷ served transactions
Diagnosis order
The Growth Diagnosis Tree
ΔR Revenue is downRoot
- Question
- Does the company even have a marketing problem?
- Definition
- R = (D × c + P × r) × f × s × v, on like-for-like branches, against the same Hijri period.
0 Step 0: Is the decline real?Gate
- Question
- Does the decline survive once calendar, comparison, price, channel and data are corrected?
- Definition
- Six filters applied before the tree is opened. A decline that disappears after them is not a problem, and is not treated with a campaign.
0.1 Calendar: compare Hijri with HijriFilter
- Question
- Are you comparing Ramadan with Ramadan, Eid with Eid, payday week with payday week?
- Evidence
- Weekly POS sales re-cut by Hijri weeks, with the count of Thursdays, Fridays and holidays in each period
- Test
- Re-run the comparison on matching Hijri weeks. The Hijri year is about 11 days shorter than the Gregorian year, so the same Gregorian month carries a different season each year. If the decline disappears, it was the calendar.
- Diagnosis
- A season moved; demand did not disappear.
- 30-day intervention
- Make the Hijri calendar the basis of every comparison report, and redraw the capacity and campaign plan on next season's waves.
- Do not
- Do not launch a campaign to cure a week that was always going to be weaker.
- Owner
- Finance
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
0.2 Like-for-like: existing branches or new ones?Filter
- Question
- Is the decline in branches open more than 12 months, or does the total mix old, new and closed branches?
- Evidence
- Monthly sales per branch, with opening and closing dates and refurbishment closure days
- Delivery orders by customer address, to measure overlap between branch radii
- Test
- Build the bridge: group growth = new-branch sales − the like-for-like decline. Then split the like-for-like decline into what moved to the new branches (cannibalization) and what was genuinely lost.
- Diagnosis
- A group can grow while every branch in it declines, and a branch can decline because its sibling took its customers.
- 30-day intervention
- A board report with three separate lines: like-for-like, new, and cannibalized. Re-measure cannibalization at months 3 and 6 after every opening.
- Do not
- Do not celebrate group growth before you see the like-for-like line, and do not advertise your way out of a sibling's cannibalization.
- Owner
- Finance + Expansion
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
0.3 Price: did what customers pay change, or what they take?Filter
- Question
- Did the average ticket rise because prices rose, while the real basket shrank?
- Evidence
- A same-item price index (current ÷ previous price, weighted by last period's quantities) from the POS
- Test
- Split the average ticket: v = price index × real basket. If the nominal ticket rose and the real basket fell, you are selling less at a higher price.
- Diagnosis
- The revenue line hides two opposite movements.
- 30-day intervention
- Add a price line and a volume line to the monthly revenue report, and give every price change a date the results are read against.
- Do not
- Do not read flat revenue after a price rise as flat demand.
- Owner
- Pricing + Finance
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
0.4 Mix and channel: did the customer move from dine-in to the app?Filter
- Question
- Did revenue fall in the books because the same demand moved to a door that is booked at net settlement after commission?
- Evidence
- Revenue and orders by door: dine-in, takeaway, aggregators, direct delivery, B2B
- Platform settlement statements, and how they are booked (gross or net)
- Test
- Compare total orders across all doors before revenue. If orders held and revenue fell, look at booking method and door mix before anything else.
- Diagnosis
- The customer did not leave. They changed doors.
- 30-day intervention
- Standardise booking: gross revenue before VAT for every door, with commission as a cost line. Then read contribution by channel.
- Do not
- Do not punish the door your customer moved to, or reward the one they left.
- Owner
- Finance
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
0.5 Data: is the number itself right?Filter
- Question
- Does the POS reconcile with e-invoices, bank settlements and platform statements?
- Evidence
- Count and value of simplified e-invoices from the e-invoicing system (Fatoora, ZATCA)
- Card and mada settlements, platform statements, voids and refunds log, and POS offline days
- Test
- Reconcile three sources per branch per week: POS, e-invoices and settlements. Any gap larger than usual is explained before it is discussed.
- Diagnosis
- Some declines are recording errors: menu codes changed, a branch moved between regions, or VAT counted inside the number one year and outside it the next.
- 30-day intervention
- One source of truth and one revenue definition: net sales before VAT and after discount.
- Do not
- Do not call marketing into a meeting whose number has not been reconciled.
- Owner
- Finance
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
0.6 One-offs: was last year the odd one?Filter
- Question
- Did the comparison period hold a one-off: a large catering order, a launch spike, a competitor's closure, or road works outside the branch this year?
- Evidence
- An events log per branch, large B2B orders, and days when access to the branch was disrupted
- Test
- Remove one-offs from both periods, then compare again.
- Diagnosis
- The base was inflated, or the road was blocked.
- 30-day intervention
- A standing events log per branch, updated weekly and attached to every comparison report.
- Do not
- Do not judge a branch against a number made by an order that will not repeat.
- Owner
- Finance + Operations
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
D Demand reaching you is downBranch
- Question
- Are fewer new people putting you among their options?
- Definition
- D: people new to the brand who reached you in the period: opened your app page, walked into a branch, or searched for you.
D1 The market itself shrankLeaf
- Question
- Did the whole category fall in your city, not just you?
- Evidence
- SAMA's weekly point-of-sale data for restaurants and cafés by city (card-terminal payments only; not cash or in-app payments)
- Test
- Compare your like-for-like growth with the sector's growth in your city for the same Hijri weeks. If you fell as much as the market, your share held.
- Diagnosis
- The tide went out; the boat held its place.
- 30-day intervention
- Reset costs, rosters and stock to the new market size, protect margin, and send the next riyal to the occasions still growing.
- Do not
- Do not buy share with discounts in a shrinking market; you pay the discount on every order that was coming anyway.
- Owner
- Finance + Operations
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
D2 You lost share of mindLeaf
- Question
- When the family group asks 'where shall we go?', does your name come up less often?
- Evidence
- A small monthly sample: which brand they name first for each buying moment (after isha, lunch, unexpected guests)
- Branded search and Google profile views, against the market's trend
- Competitor openings in your trade area
- Test
- Three conditions together: the market is flat or growing, your share is falling, and conversion and capacity are sound. If any condition fails, the problem is elsewhere.
- Diagnosis
- People did not reject you. They forgot you.
- 30-day intervention
- Name the three biggest buying moments in your category, tie your name to them with consistent distinctive assets, and aim reach at those moments, not at follower counts.
- Do not
- Do not measure success in followers, and do not manage average CAC; watch the marginal one.
- Owner
- Marketing
- Verdict
- A marketing problem
D3 You became harder to reachLeaf
- Question
- Did you become harder to find or reach: a narrower delivery radius, shorter hours, a lower app ranking, a blocked road?
- Evidence
- Actual visible hours on each platform × delivery radius in km
- Published branch data (hours, location, menu) on Google, the apps and AI assistants
- In FMCG: numeric and weighted distribution from the retail audit
- Test
- Match the date demand fell with the date of any change in visibility, radius, hours or distribution.
- Diagnosis
- People look for you and cannot find the way.
- 30-day intervention
- Restore hours and radius where capacity allows, correct the branch data on every platform, and give it one owner.
- Do not
- Do not compensate with advertising for a door you closed yourself.
- Owner
- Operations + Expansion
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
D4 The occasion shiftedLeaf
- Question
- After the calendar is corrected, did demand move from one occasion to another: late night to lunch, the dining room to the home?
- Evidence
- Sales by daypart and door, on matching Hijri weeks
- Test
- If one daypart fell and another grew by about the same, it is an occasion migration, not a demand loss.
- Diagnosis
- The same customer, with a different job to do.
- 30-day intervention
- Redesign menu, rosters and format around the rising occasion.
- Do not
- Do not push an occasion whose time has passed with advertising.
- Owner
- Product & menu + Operations
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
c Conversion is down: they saw you and didn't buyBranch
- Question
- Did they reach you and then choose someone else at the last moment?
- Definition
- c = new customers ÷ demand reaching you. On the app: opened the page, then ordered. In retail: walked in, then paid.
c1 Price and value at the moment of choiceLeaf
- Question
- Did the customer see your app price, hold it against the menu board they remember, and walk away?
- Evidence
- Conversion by item and door before and after the price-change date
- The app-to-branch price gap on 'ruler' items, and direct competitors' prices
- Test
- Branches or platforms that changed price against those that did not, in the same weeks. If conversion fell only where price changed, it is price.
- Diagnosis
- Customers do not read your price. They compare it.
- 30-day intervention
- Protect the ruler items, move channel cost into items and boxes designed for delivery, and name the gap where terms allow.
- Do not
- Do not fix a price problem with a temporary offer; you teach the customer to wait for the discount.
- Owner
- Pricing
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
c2 Not available at the moment of choiceLeaf
- Question
- Did the customer reach you and find the item sold out, the branch closed against its published hours, or the app offline for a reason unrelated to demand?
- Evidence
- A sold-out log by hour, published vs actual hours, and pause reasons on each platform
- Test
- The tie-break rule: a pause because of order pressure goes to Capacity; every other pause or stock-out stays here. Then compare conversion in clean hours with disrupted hours.
- Diagnosis
- The door is shut, and the advertising is sending people to it.
- 30-day intervention
- Measure lost orders ÷ attempted orders for two weeks at the five highest-volume branches, and fix the top three stock-out causes.
- Do not
- Do not raise spend to bring people to an item that is not there.
- Owner
- Operations
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
c3 Ordering is hardLeaf
- Question
- Did the path from wanting to a paid order get longer: a long menu, failing payments, missing photos?
- Evidence
- Steps and minutes from page open to payment, payment failure rate, abandoned baskets
- Test
- If conversion fell after an app, menu or payment update, and recovered where the update was rolled back, it is friction.
- Diagnosis
- The customer wanted it; the system wore them out.
- 30-day intervention
- Remove one step from the highest-volume path this month, and fix the top cause of payment failure.
- Do not
- Do not drive more visits to a page people fall out of.
- Owner
- Product & menu + Operations
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
c4 Reviews and what people sayLeaf
- Question
- Did your rating fall, or complaints go unanswered, so people see you and hesitate?
- Evidence
- Rating trend over the last 4 weeks on Google and each platform, complaints open more than 24 hours, and the most repeated reason
- Test
- Check whether the rating fell before conversion did. Then ask: is the most repeated complaint operational (lateness, wrong orders, cold food) or about communication (expectations, photos)?
- Diagnosis
- The rating is a symptom. The cause is usually in the kitchen; the reply is in marketing's hands.
- 30-day intervention
- Operations fixes the most repeated cause; marketing answers every complaint within 24 hours.
- Do not
- Do not buy reviews or bury complaints; the credibility of the reply matters more than the count of negatives.
- Owner
- Operations + Marketing
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
v Average value is downBranch
- Question
- Is each visit worth less?
- Definition
- v = net sales before VAT and after discount ÷ served transactions. It splits into price index × real basket.
v1 The mix traded downLeaf
- Question
- Did customers move to cheaper items or sizes, or to a daypart with a smaller ticket?
- Evidence
- A price–volume–mix analysis from the POS, by item and daypart
- Test
- Hold prices at last period's level and recompute the ticket with today's mix. If it falls, the mix is the cause.
- Diagnosis
- The customer stayed, but picks cheaper.
- 30-day intervention
- Re-engineer the menu: put high-contribution items where the eye lands, and design a middle meal between the cheapest and the dearest.
- Do not
- Do not raise the cheap items' prices to compensate; you will speed up the exit.
- Owner
- Product & menu + Pricing
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
v2 The discount became the priceLeaf
- Question
- Has the share of discounted orders risen until full price is the exception?
- Evidence
- The discounted share of each door's orders and its trend, and brand-funded discount from platform statements
- The increment ratio in the latest holdout test
- Test
- If the discounted share rises while the increment ratio falls, you are subsidising a habit, not building demand. Switch the offer off in half the pairs and measure what remains.
- Diagnosis
- Here marketing is not the cure; it is the cause.
- 30-day intervention
- No offer without a pre-set increment test, and an exit test on the recurring offers this month.
- Do not
- Do not read an offer on before-and-after, and do not stop every offer at once.
- Owner
- Marketing + Finance
- Verdict
- A marketing problem
v3 The basket shrankLeaf
- Question
- Are there fewer items per ticket: fewer drinks, fewer sides, broken combos?
- Evidence
- Items per ticket and drink and side attach rates, by branch and shift
- Test
- If the drop is concentrated in certain shifts or branches, it is counter behaviour or combo design, not a customer decision.
- Diagnosis
- It was not offered, so it was not bought.
- 30-day intervention
- One suggestion line at the counter and in the app, a combo designed for attachment, and a daily attach-rate check.
- Do not
- Do not turn the suggestion into pressure; one suggestion is enough.
- Owner
- Operations + Product & menu
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
v4 The door changed the ticketLeaf
- Question
- Did orders move to a door with a smaller ticket or less left over, with the same customer?
- Evidence
- Average ticket and contribution per order by door
- Test
- Compute the ticket for each door separately. If it held within every door and the total average fell, it is the mix between doors.
- Diagnosis
- The ticket did not shrink; the door changed.
- 30-day intervention
- Price each door to its cost within the terms, and design delivery boxes and baskets that carry its cost.
- Do not
- Do not grow a door whose contribution you do not know.
- Owner
- Finance + Pricing
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
f Frequency is down: your customers come less oftenBranch
- Question
- Is the same active customer visiting fewer times?
- Definition
- f = attempted transactions ÷ active customers. It measures how intensely those who bought in the period bought, not who stayed away.
f1 You lost one of their occasionsLeaf
- Question
- Do they still come to you for dinner, but no longer for lunch?
- Evidence
- Visits per identified customer by daypart and occasion
- Test
- If frequency fell in one occasion and held in the rest, the problem is that occasion: its hours, its menu, or its speed.
- Diagnosis
- The customer did not leave you. They stopped hiring you for one job.
- 30-day intervention
- Product fixes the offer for the lost occasion; then marketing ties it to its buying moment.
- Do not
- Do not advertise an occasion whose offer you have not fixed.
- Owner
- Product & menu + Marketing
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
f2 They now split their visits with someone elseLeaf
- Question
- Is the same customer now giving a new competitor some of their visits?
- Evidence
- Frequency decline by trade area, against competitor opening dates
- A short question to a customer sample: where else did you eat this week?
- Test
- Remember double jeopardy: smaller brands have fewer buyers who buy less often. If frequency fell alone while penetration held, that is a strong signal of a specific competitor in a specific trade area.
- Diagnosis
- They did not drop you. They started sharing you.
- 30-day intervention
- In the affected trade areas only: remind people of the buying moments you win, and protect what makes your product different.
- Do not
- Do not start a citywide price war with the new competitor.
- Owner
- Marketing + Product & menu
- Verdict
- A marketing problem
f3 Coming back became tiringLeaf
- Question
- Did repeat visits get harder: less parking, longer peak waits, a clumsy reorder in the app, a loyalty programme that ended?
- Evidence
- Average peak wait, reorder steps, and the date of any loyalty programme change
- Test
- Compare identified customers' frequency before and after the change in affected branches against unaffected ones.
- Diagnosis
- The customer likes you, but the way to you got longer.
- 30-day intervention
- Remove the single biggest obstacle to the second visit this month.
- Do not
- Do not give a come-back discount to a customer bothered by the journey, not the price.
- Owner
- Operations + Product & menu
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
f4 Price cut the visitsLeaf
- Question
- After the price rise, does the same customer now come twice instead of three times?
- Evidence
- Identified customers' frequency before and after the price-change date
- Test
- If frequency fell only where price changed, and the nominal ticket rose, the customer is spending their usual budget in fewer visits.
- Diagnosis
- The customer did not change their budget. They changed their number of visits.
- 30-day intervention
- Judge the price rise on contribution, not on ticket, and revisit the ruler items first.
- Do not
- Do not celebrate a higher ticket before you see frequency.
- Owner
- Pricing
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
r Retention is down: they didn't come back at allBranch
- Question
- How many of last period's customers did not buy from you even once this period?
- Definition
- r = known customers who bought this period ÷ last period's active customers. A yes-or-no question per customer, not how often.
r1 The service let them downLeaf
- Question
- Are the customers who came on a bad night (lateness, wrong order, refund) the ones who did not return?
- Evidence
- 90-day repeat by first-visit conditions: utilization that hour, wait time, and any error or refund
- Test
- Compare the return rate of two cohorts: first visit clean, versus first visit at a choked peak or with an error. The gap is the price of service.
- Diagnosis
- The campaign chose the night the customer met you, and it was your worst night.
- 30-day intervention
- Fix the top cause of errors and refunds, and contact every let-down customer within 24 hours.
- Do not
- Do not buy new customers to replace the ones service drove away.
- Owner
- Operations
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
r2 A new competitor took themLeaf
- Question
- Is the non-return concentrated in a trade area where a competitor opened?
- Evidence
- Return rate by trade area, against a map of competitor openings and dates
- Test
- If return fell only in the competitor's trade area and held elsewhere, it is the competitor. If it fell everywhere, look at service or value.
- Diagnosis
- People tried the new option, and some stayed there.
- 30-day intervention
- Identify what the competitor offers that you do not, and close the gap in the product before the message.
- Do not
- Do not answer a competitor's opening with a citywide discount.
- Owner
- Product & menu + Marketing
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
r3 They came for the discount and left with itLeaf
- Question
- Do customers acquired with a deep discount fail to return at full price?
- Evidence
- 90-day return by first-visit discount depth and by door
- Test
- If deep-discount customers return clearly less than full-price customers through the same door, the discount bought a visit, not a customer.
- Diagnosis
- The value that attracted them was not yours. It was the discount's.
- 30-day intervention
- Redesign the acquisition offer to reward the second visit, not the first, and compute CAC payback on the cohort.
- Do not
- Do not count discount customers as acquired before you see them return.
- Owner
- Pricing + Marketing
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
r4 The product changed from branch to branchLeaf
- Question
- Do new branches fail to repeat the reference branches' experience, so customers try once and do not return?
- Evidence
- Return rate by branch age against the reference cohort at the same age, and the Geographic Replication Index
- Test
- If weak return is concentrated in the latest opening wave, the system is not travelling.
- Diagnosis
- Branch 30 does not taste like branch 3.
- 30-day intervention
- Find what is not travelling (recipe, training, supplier) and fix it before the next wave.
- Do not
- Do not open branch 31 before branch 30 performs like branch 3.
- Owner
- Operations
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
s Capacity: demand came and was turned awayBranch
- Question
- Did demand arrive that you could not serve?
- Definition
- s = served ÷ attempted transactions. What is not served because of throughput limits: the app paused 'due to high demand', rejected orders, cars that left the lane.
s1 The peak is full (80% or more)Leaf
- Question
- Does the branch run at 80% or more of its capacity in the peak hour, delivery included?
- Evidence
- U = peak orders from all doors ÷ (orders the kitchen serves per hour × peak hours)
- Test
- Compute U for each branch and each peak window, and for the two Ramadan windows separately. At 80% or more, any fall in s, r or the rating is read first as capacity.
- Diagnosis
- The hall is full. The invitations worked; the chairs did not multiply.
- 30-day intervention
- Redirect demand to quieter hours, a nearby branch or pickup; narrow the peak delivery radius when a sister branch has room.
- Do not
- At 80%, no new campaign before capacity is added or demand redirected. Above 100%, no campaign for that branch at all.
- Owner
- Operations
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
s2 The slowest station runs the branchLeaf
- Question
- Where do orders pile up: the grill, the payment window, or the riders' shelf?
- Evidence
- Per-station timestamps from the kitchen screen and POS, and a manual count every fifteen minutes on Thursday night
- Test
- The station with the longest queue in front and the shortest behind is the constraint. By Little's law, the queue = arrival rate × time in the system; a campaign raises the first, the constraint sets the second.
- Diagnosis
- The branch moves at the speed of its slowest station.
- 30-day intervention
- The five focusing steps: identify the constraint, exploit it fully, subordinate the other stations to it, elevate it, then look for the next one.
- Do not
- Do not add staff or equipment at a station that is not the constraint.
- Owner
- Operations
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
s3 The app is paused at peakLeaf
- Question
- How many minutes was the app paused 'due to high demand' over the last two Thursday nights?
- Evidence
- Busy-mode and pause log on each platform, by minute and reason, with rejected orders
- Test
- Multiply paused minutes by the usual order rate in those minutes: that is the demand turned away. Compare it with what was spent to bring demand in the same week.
- Diagnosis
- The advertising knocks, and the app says: busy.
- 30-day intervention
- Set an order cap per window instead of a full pause, a separate riders' lane, and a visible expected time for the customer.
- Do not
- Do not run paid visibility on a platform you are pausing in the same hour.
- Owner
- Operations
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
s4 Capacity on paper, not in the hourLeaf
- Question
- Is the capacity there across the day, but not in the hour people come?
- Evidence
- The shift roster against the hourly demand curve, with the two Ramadan windows (before iftar, around suhoor) separately
- Test
- If peak U is above 80% while the daily average is low, the problem is how hours are spread, not how big the team is.
- Diagnosis
- The team is big enough, but in the wrong hour.
- 30-day intervention
- Rebuild rosters on the Hijri demand curve, and decide automation versus hiring with one written rule.
- Do not
- Do not staff for the daily average; the peak is what governs.
- Owner
- Operations
- Verdict
- Not a marketing problem
P The inherited baseBase
- Question
- How many active customers did you inherit from last period?
- Definition
- P is not a branch to diagnose this period; it is the result of last period's tree. Part of today's decline was decided yesterday.
- Evidence
- Identified active customers in the previous period
Signatures: patterns that move together
- A capacity crunch: s falls at peak, then r falls for cohorts met on crowded nights, then the rating, then c. s1 r1 c4
- A price rise: Nominal v rises, the real basket falls, and c and f fall only where price changed. c1 f4 v1
- Discount addiction: The discounted share rises, v falls, f rises during the offer, then r falls after it. v2 r3
- A new competitor: In one trade area: D falls against the market, f falls, r falls. Outside it, everything holds. D2 f2 r2
- A brand being forgotten: D falls against the market in every trade area, while c, s and f hold. D2
- A system that does not travel: r and v are weaker in the new branches only; the reference branches are sound. r4 v3