Saudi cases: platforms and ecosystems, with sources

Companion to «تصميم السوق» / Market Design. Every fact is dated and sourced; "company-stated" means the figure is the company's own claim, not an audited market figure. Status: V = page opened and checked; V-s = publisher's own search snippet only; U = unverified (not used in the essay).

Rules applied. No market-share splits between delivery platforms. The only delivery-share fact used is Keeta at about 10% of order volume within 4–5 months of entry (Redseer, 24 Feb 2025). Jahez figures come only from Jahez's own releases, reports and exchange disclosures. The analysis columns (subsidy side, network effect, multi-homing, switching costs, value capture) are the author's reading using the credited frameworks; they are not facts about any company's contracts.

1. Delivery aggregators

Facts

Deliberately not used: the delivery-platform share splits that appear in some press coverage of the Uber deal (including Arab News and PYMNTS/CPI). They are single-source, definition-unclear and against the series rule.

Reading (author's)

• Subsidised side: customers (delivery fees, promotions); the money side is restaurants (commission, visibility). Jahez's own FY2025 mix (commission and advertising up, customer delivery-fee revenue down — see s2e5) is consistent with this reading at platform level.
• Network effect: cross-side and local (Zhu & Iansiti 2019): restaurant density matters within a delivery radius. This is why a well-funded entrant could win order volume city by city.
• Multi-homing: restaurants commonly list on several apps; customers vary with subscriptions and habit. Where customers single-home, restaurants face a competitive bottleneck (Armstrong 2006).
• Switching costs: for restaurants, ratings, ranking history and contract terms; for customers, subscriptions and saved payment/addresses.
• Value capture: the customer relationship and data stay mostly with the platform (Channel Ledger doors table).
• Effect on the restaurant: reach into new neighbourhoods and no fleet to build, in exchange for commission, visibility fees and a thinner, contract-dependent margin; the Ledger's commission headroom is the binding number.

2. Jahez as an ecosystem (envelopment)

Reading (author's): delivery (the order), Marn (the till), Sol (the supplier), Logi (the rider). This is envelopment in Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne's sense: reaching into adjacent layers of the restaurant's stack. For a restaurant, it raises the question of tying — which GAC's 2023 conditions address for that transaction — and of how many layers of its operation sit with one counterparty.

3. Buy now, pay later (Tabby, Tamara)

Reading (author's): subsidised side = shoppers (no interest on split-in-4); money side = merchants (fee in the merchant contract, not published). Cross-side and national network effect (more merchants make the app more useful; more shoppers make acceptance more valuable). Merchants usually multi-home (accept several providers); shoppers may single-home through habit and limits. Value capture: the provider holds the shopper's credit relationship and data. Effect on the retailer: a possible uplift in conversion/basket that must be measured against the fee with a holdout (research agenda S5); the Ledger's increment test applies to a payment method as to a promotion.

4. Store-builder platforms (Salla, Zid)

Note the two Salla store counts use different definitions and dates; the essay cites neither number.

Reading (author's): subsidised side = merchants (tools at low entry cost); complementors = app developers and service providers (the app marketplace). Network effect mainly between merchants and developers, not merchant-to-shopper (shoppers don't choose a store because it runs on Salla). Merchants single-home; switching costs rise with each installed app, theme and integration. Effect: fast entry into e-commerce for retailers and FMCG brands; the decision rule is to choose by data portability and exit terms.

5. Restaurant POS ecosystems (Foodics, Marn)

Reading (author's): a POS is a platform whose complementors are integrations (delivery aggregators, accounting, loyalty, inventory). The restaurant is the subsidised/anchor side; complementors pay or co-sell. Network effect: more restaurants attract more integrations and vice versa. Restaurants single-home; switching costs rise sharply once payments and financing run through the same system (financing tied to sales data is a classic lock-in). Effect: better operating data and fewer tablets, plus a switching cost that should be priced at signing.

6. B2B supply marketplaces (Sary / SILQ, Sol)

Reading (author's): marketplace vs reseller (Hagiu & Wright 2015) matters here: many B2B "marketplaces" hold stock and act as resellers. Subsidised side: small buyers (prices, delivery, sometimes credit). Buyers multi-home unless credit ties them. Effect: lower friction for independents; for a multi-branch group, it is the benchmark any "supply for smaller restaurants" idea must beat (Move 3).

7. Loyalty, wallets, super-app ambitions

Reading (author's): coalition loyalty is a two-sided market between cardholders and merchants, run by a bank or telco that already owns one side. For a group, it is a Partnership bridge (Doctrine): the partner brings a thick side; the group pays in points or discounts. Judge it with the Bridges scorecard and the increment test.

8. Public rails: ZATCA e-invoicing and SAMA open banking

Reading (author's): rails are standards nobody owns. They lower the cost of moving data between vendors (switching costs fall) and can lower the cost of direct payments (payment initiation). They are the counterweight to private lock-in, but integration itself has a cost (research agenda S6).

9. Competition law (description only)

Back to the paper